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Permanent changes in trade policy do not affect intertemporal
prices and should thus leave private savings unaffected. But if
trade reform will not be reversed and the government cannot
credibly communicate  that intent, consumers trade on the wrong
assumption  - so private savings are lower than they should be.
This justifies policy intervention to increase private savings.
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Rapid trade liberalization is oftenl  followed by a  Second and more academic, in the standard
surge of impons and a deterioration in the  expected utility approach, risk aversion is low
current account. The macroeconomic counter-  when intertemporal substitution is high, because
part of this is a decline in private savings.  the relevant elasticities are each other's inverse
- so whenever the uncertainty effect is impor-
Tlhe  expectation that tariffs will be reim-  tant, the direct anticipation effect is not, and vice
posed lowers the expected consumption rate of  versa. This result is reversed in the non-ex-
interest (makes current goods cheaper in terms of  pected utility approach, as van Wijnbergen found
future goods).  So anticipation of a future tariff  out: the two effects are complementary where
increase will increase current consumption if the  the direct anticipation is important.
intertemporal substitution elasticity is higher
than 1. If consumers intemalize the impact of  These results have important policy implica-
future tariff revenues on their after-tax income,  tions. If trade reform will not be reversed but the
the effect on savings will always be negative - government cannot credibly communicate that to
even for an intertemporal substitution elasticity  the private sector, consumers effectively trade on
below 1.  the wrong intertemporal prices.  So, private
savings are lower than they should be. This
What is the impact of policy uncertainty on  justifies policy intervention to increase private
private savings'? To deal separately with the  savings, preferably 'hrough a temporary increase
impact of shifts in intertemporal prices and with  in consumption taxes.  If this is not feasible, the
risk aversion, van Wijnbergen uses the Ordinal  second best is a temporary tariff-  the equiva-
Certainty Equivalence approach. He establishes  lent to gradual rather than "cold turkey" liberal-
that trade policy uncertainty by itself will further  ization.
reduce savings if (1) there is positive risk
aversion and (b) the intertemporal substitution  The case for such intervention is strength-
elasticity excceds 1.  ened by the possibility that the private savings
response could  cate such a large current
This result is interesting for two reasons.  account deficit that the trade reform itself would
First, it shows how policy uncertainty about  indeed get reversed  -in  a self-fulfilling proph-
tariffs reinforces Lhe  negative effe't on savings  ecy.
of an expected policy reversal exactly when
intcrtemporal substitution elasticity is high.  So
the two effects go in the sane  direction exactly
when they matter most.
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1  Introduction
Rapid  and  comprehensive  reduction  in  barriers  to international  trade  has
often  been followed  by a sharp  deterioration  in the  current  account  (Rodrik
(1990);  Dornbusch  (1987)1/).  The  steep,  $9  bUS  deterioration  in  I  'xico's
current  account  the  2  years  after  the  trade  reform  process  was  accelerated  in
1987  is  only  the  most recent  example.  The  macroeconomic  counterpart  of the
deterioration  has typically  been a decline  in  private  savings;  no clear
response  pattern  has  been  observed  for  private  investment.  Economic  theory  has
in recent  years  reached  clear  conclusions  on these  matters;  the  problem  with
these  conclusions  is that  they  seem  counterfactual.
The  problem  does  not really  reside  with investment.  The investment
response  will  depend  on relative  capital  intensity  of the  industry  whose
protection  is  removed  compared  to the  sectors  favored  by trade  liberalization.
Putty-clay  considerations  would  tend  to strengthen  the  investment  response,  as
old  capital  gets  scrapped  more  quickly  in response  to changing  relative
prices.  On the  other  hand,  policy  uncertainty  bestows  an  option  value  on
assets  more liquid  than  physical  capital  (van  Wijnbergen  (1985))  and  thus
tends  to depress  investment.  But  with  no clear  prediction  emerging  from
economic  theory,  the  ambiguous  empirical  record  on this  score  is  only  to  be
expected.
But  the  situation  is  different  with savings.  In an elegant  analysis,
Razin  and  Svensson  (1983)  pointed  out  that  a  permanent  reduction  in tariffs
affects  current  and  future  goods  in the  same  way,  leaving  intertemporal
relative  prices  and  private  savings  unchanged.  Gradual  tariff  reduction  in
fact  raises  the  price  of current  goods  in  terms  of future  goods  and  would  thus
tend  to improve  private  savings  (Edwards  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1988)  make  a case
for  gradualism  in the  presence  of capital  market  imperfections  on this  basis).
It is  this  body of theory  that,  for  all its  theoretical  elegance,  seems  firmly
at variance  with the  facts.
This  paper  starts  from  the  observation  that  anticipated  policy  reversal
may  explain  a decline  in  private  savings  for  the  same  reason  gradual  tariff
reduction  causes  private  savings  to go  up.  Temporarily  low  tariffs  lower  the
relative  price  of  current  goods  in terms  of future  goods  and  thus  tend  to
depress  private  savings.
However,  the  possibility  of  policy  reversal  does  more than  skew
intertemporal  relative  prices  towards  today  rather  than  tomorrow;  it  also
increases  policy  uncertainty  per  se.  Is it  possible  that  this  increase  in
uncertainty  reinforces  the  private  savings  impact  of an anticipated  reversal
of trade  reform?  This  cannot  really  be analyzed  in the  standard  expected
utility  framework  because  risk  aversion  and  intertemporal  substitution,  two
very  different  attributes  of consumer  preferences,  are  arbitrarily  confined  to
be inversely  related  in that  framevork.  I show  that,  in  the  context  of
imperfectly  credible  trade  reform,  this ir-erse  relation  implies  that  policy
uncertainty  is  unimportant  when  it  would  reduce  private  savings,  and,  when
important,  would  tend  to increase  private  savings.
1  Dornbusch  (1987)  makes  the  point  in  a different  context:  he argues  that
an  increase  in  tariffs  would  improve  the  US current  account.  By  symmetry  (not  an
innocuous  assumption..),  this  supports  the  view  that  a  decrease  would  deteriorate
the  CA.3
But this conclusion depends entirely on the inverse relation between
sk aversion and intertemporal substitution  elasticity imposed  arbitrarily by
the framework of expected utility maximization. The "Ordinal Certainty
Equivalence" (OCE)  approach introduced  by Seiden (1978)  offers a way out of
the straightjacket imposed by expected utility maximization. The OCE approach
allows independent parametrization of risk aversion and intertemporal
substitution. Within the OCE framework, I show that,  with positive risk
aversion, policy uncertainty will in fact reinforce the negative savings
impact of an anticipated policy reversal especially  when that negative impact
is strong. This suggests that  with high risk aversion and high intertemporal
substitution, a  rapid trade reform that is  not fully credible may depress
private savings significantly,  with attendant negative impact on the current
account. This conclusion seems to accord well with actual experierce.
2  The model
There are two periods, 0 and 1. Thus the time consistency problems that
naive applications of the OCE approach lead to in multi-period setting (cf
Weil (1990))  do not arise. Consumers consume home and foreign goods in each
period. We choose the home good as numeraire; and the exogenous world relative
price of the foreign good in terms of the  home good is normalized to one.
There is no tariff in period zero; we have just entered a period of complete
trade liberalization. But n, the  probability that the old tariff will be
restored in the next period, is larger than zero. If such a policy reversal
takes place, the future local price of the foreign good, T 1, will equal t 1 >
1. Without a reversal, T1 - 1.
To simplify the structure of income effects, we assume that consumers
have no within period income, just wealth at the beginning of period 0, W 0.
Wealth is spent today or tomorrow, and within each period on home goods h and
imports m. Wealth not spent in period 0 earns a certain rate of re-'urn  R (the
world rate of interest) between period 0 and 1.
We assume homothetic, unit-elastic preferences accross goods within a
time Reriod. Consumers know the  within period tariff at the beginning of the
period, before allocating expenditure over home and foreign goods. We can
therefore define real consumption expenditure  C1 and the associated dual price
index  Pi (a "*n  indicates  an optimally chosen quantity):
C 1 =  (h;  +  mOT,) l  (1)
p1 n  Ta
CO is defined similarly. By assumption the first period tariff is zero:
To - 1. a is the budget share  of foreign goods in each period; a is constant
because of the assumption  of a unitary within-period substitution elasticity.
Under these assumptions, the within-period budget identities are:4
W2 - o,  pCs  V  W  (2)
WI  - (WO - CO) R
We use the  "Ordinal  Certainty  Equivalence"  framework  (Selden  (1978))  to
disentangle  risk  aversion  and  intertemporal  substitution.  Risk  aversion  is
parametrized  by the  coefficient  of relative  risk  aversion,  y; intertemporal
substitution  by the  interteRporal  substitution  elasticity  l/p.  This  results  in
a  welfare  function:
v  - (COP  +  p  (EC31-j)  1I)  '
=  (CO  P  +  p  Cl#E1  (3)
with  CM  ')
Using (1)  and (2)  yields  an expression  for  C1:
o  -Co +  (Ti/R)  Cl
(4)
=  Co  + C1 /R  where  R  *  X(
Thus,
C'  R  (Wo - Co)
- (No - Co) 1 -T E(R" 1 (')(
U  (wo - Co) 1T41T




Trade  policy  reversal  thus  affects  private  consumption  in  period  0
entirely  through  its  impact  on the  risk-adjusted  consumption  rate  of interest,5
(1-P)  (7)
A  y  P
RY.  An increase in this rate will affect first  period consumption:
aC,  1  A  (1-p)  (8)
Y(  1.+A)2R,i  P
- 4p-1);  qX >  0
If the intertemporal substitution is larger than one (p  < 1), a higher risk
adjusted ccnsumption rate of interest depresses private consumption, in line
with well established theory.
3  Trade Reform. Future Policy Reversal and Private Savings
3.1  Anticipated Trade Policy Reversal and 'rivate Savings
Consider first the impact of anticipated trade policy reversal. With the
utility structure used, uncertainty has no impact if the coefficient of risk
aversion, y, is set to zero. Thus, with y-0, any impact on savings is due
exclusively to the anticipation of policy reversal, not to uncertainty .er  se.
Assume a simple  binomial distribution over future tariff rates:
T,  =  t,  with  probab.1i  sty  it  (9)
1  witl  probability  1-it
Thus the risk adjusted consumption rate of interest becomes:
*  G  (E(  R  )  1-Y)  Y(10)
R  (1+ic(t-"(1  Y)_1)  )  1-Y
Without risk aversion, y-0, and the risk adjusted consumption rate of
interest rate in fact equals the expected rate:
RO  G  (1-it)R  +.  R  (1  &)
=  R(1  + i(t'-1))6
From (11)  and (8),  one  can  easily  assess  the  impact  of anticipated  trade
policy  reversal  on first  period  consumption:
aCo  (aco)  ()R
(12)
=  X  R(t;,-1)  (p-l)
>  0  iff  1  >  1
p
(12)  establishes  the  first  point  of this  paper;  an anticipated  trade
policy  reversal  (i.e.  an  anticipation  that  future  tariffs  will  exceed  current
tariffs)  will lead  to an increase  in  current  consumption  or a  decline  in
private  savings  if  the  intertemporal  substitution  elasticity  exceeds  1.2/
3.2  Private  Savings  and  Uncertainty  about  Future  Trade  Policy.
Does  uncertainty  on future  trade  policy  per se,  for  any  given  expected
value  of future  tariffs  3/,  have  an impact  on first  period  consumption?  This
would  open  up a second  channel  through  which  a trade  reform  with less  .han
complete  credibility  could  affect  private  savings.  This  could  be assessed  by
increasing  the  variance  for  given  expected  value  of the  future  dual  price
index,  pl.  However,  the  particular  structure  of the  model  makes  it  rather
difficult  to engineer  a mean  preserving  increase  in  uncertainty;  this  would
imply  a  very  non-linear  restriction  on t,  and  i (it  requires  keeping
expression  (11)  constant).  We therefore  follow  a different  approach.
In the  OCE  framework,  assuming  y-O  eliminates  all  impact  of uncertainty.
Thus  an analysis  of the  case  for  y-O isr'  tes  the  pure  expected  reversal
effect,  with  no pollution  by uncertainty  r  r se;  this  is the  case  presented  in
Section  3.1.  The impact  of uncertainty  can  then  be assessed  by looking  at the
impact  of increasing  y. Increasing  y leaves  the  expected  consumption  discount
rate  unaffected,  since  it  only involves  a change  in  preferences,  not  in the
objective  environment.  It therefore  does  not  have  a first  order  effect  on the
expected  reversal  effect  analysed  in Section  3.1;  in  the  OCE  approach  risk
aversion  and  intertemporal  substitution  can  be separated.  Therefore  the impact
of increasing  y is  the  impact  of uncertainty  at the  value  y  has  been increased
to.  Finally,  since  the  only  uncertainty  in  the  model  is the  uncertainty
related  to future  tariffs,  the  entire  impact  of the  increase  in  y is  due  to
the  existing  uncertainty  about  future  trade  policy.  The  impact  of an increase
in  y  would  be zero  if  there  was  no tariff  uncertainty.
Therefore  we consider  how  an increase  in  y  would  affect  first  period
consumption  given  the  stochastic  structure  outlined  in (9).  Once  again,  the
2  The impact  on savings  will be unconditionally  negative  if consumers
anticipate  the  income  effects  of  a second  period  rebate  of tariff  revenues.
3  or, more precisely,  for any given  expected  value of the consumption
discount  rate.7
entire  impact  of  both uncertainty  and  of increases  in  y runs through  the
impact  on the  risk  adjusted  interest  rate.  Thus  consider  the  derivative  of  Ry
with respect  to  y. To this  end  we introduce  some  simplifying  notation.  Define
first  the  consumption  discount  rate  in case  of a zero  future  tariff  as  'tU,  and
in the  case  of a positive  future  tariff  as RL.  Also,  define  k as k-1- 1. 0
then  gets:
-y  a  (X RLk  +  (1-ic)R)  (13)
a  (ERi)  ;  i  =  L,H
E is the  expectations  operator  over  the  distribution  specified  ilL  equ. (9).
Taking  logs  and  bringing  k to the  other  side  yields:  4/
k  logRy  - log(ER,")
Log-differentiation  yields:
k  dR  log,;  =  E(Ri log(Rj))  (15)
Jy  dkc  E(RP  )
Multiply  both sides  by k and  rearrange  terms  to get:
E(R?  )  R2  dRy ,
R 7dk  ~~~~~~~~~~(16)
=E(Ri! log(Rk) - E(Rik)  log(ERk)
>0
.*  I  ,m  indebted to  Ravi  Kanbur for the following derivation; the result is
a specia.  case  of a general  proposition  in  Diarond  and  Stiglitz  (1974).8
The  inequality  in (16)  obtains  because  of co:.vexity  of the  function
f(z)-zlog(z).  But  since  k - 1 - y, equ. (16)  establishes  what  we are  after:
(16) ,  ksl-y  |  dR  <  O  (17)
Thus introducing  risk  aversion  in  the  presence  of uncertainty  about
future  trade  reform  will  unambiguously  lower  the  risk  adjusted  consumption
rate  of interest,  something  that  it  would  not  have  done  without  the  trade
Lelated  uncertainty  (since  there  is  no other  source  of uncertainty).  We can
therefore  conclude  that  uncertaiuity  about  future  trade  p-licy  reversal  will
lower  the  risk  adjusted  consumption  rate  of interast.  But (8)  states  that  a
cut in  the  risk  adjusted  rate  of interest  will  depress  private  savings  if  the
in:ertemporal  substitution  elasticity  is  larger  than  one (p  < 1).  We can  thus
claim  the  following  proposition:
Proposition  1:  Uncertainty  about  future  trade  pclicy  per  se (i.e.  for  given
exRected  value  of the  tariff)  will  depress  private  consumption  today  if
the  intertemporal  rate  of substitution  exceeds  one (p  <  1) and  there  is
positive  risk  aversion  (y  >  0).
4  Conclusions
This  paper  starts  from  the  observation  that  trade  liberalization  is
cften  followed  by a strong  surge  of imports  and  an accompanying  current
account  deterioration.  The  macro-economic  counterpart  of this  CA deterioration
is  typically  a decline  in savings  rather  than  an investment  boom.  We show
first  of  all that  a positive  probability  of reimposition  of tariffs  in the
future  lowers  the  expected  consumption  rate  of interest  (makes  cu:rent  goods
cheaper  in terms  of future  goods).  Therefore  an anticipated  future  tariff
increase  will increase  current  consumption  if  the  intertemporal  substitution
elasticity  is  higher  than  one.  If  consumers  internalise  the  impact  of future
tariff  revenues  on their  after-tax  income,  the  aavings  impact  will  always  be
negative,  even  for  an ?.atertemporal  substitution  elasiticity  below  one.
The second,  an6 less  obvious,  result  concerns  the  impact  of policy
uncertainty  per se  on private  savings.  We are  able  to deal  separately  with  the
impact  of shifts  in expected  intertemporal  relative  prices  and  with risk
aversion  by using  the  Ordinal  Certainty  Equivalence  approach  pioneered  by
Selden  (1978).  This  approach  relaxes  the  rigid  inverse  relationship  between
intertemporal  substitution  and  risk  aversion  that  characterizes  the  expected
utility  approach  to  consumer  choice  under  uncertainty.  Within  Selden's  OCE
framework,  we establish  that  policy  uncertainty  per  se  will furth'or  reduce
private  savings  if:  (a)  there  is  positive  risk  aversion;  (b)  the  intertemporal
substitution  elasticity  exceeds  one.
This is an interesting  result  for  two  reasons.  First  it  shows  how  policy
uncertainty  shout  future  tariffs  will reinforce  the  negative  savings  impact  of
the  direct  ax.  icipat;ed  reversal  effect  exactly  when the  latter  is  large
(intertemporai.  subs  ltution  elasticity  is  high).  The  two  effects  thus  go into
the  same  direction  exactly  when they  matter  most.  The  second  observation  is9
more  academic.  In the  standard  expected  utility  approach,  risk  aversion  is  low
when intertemporal  substitution  is  high,  because  the  relevant  elasticities  are
each  other's  inverse.  The  consequence  of this  is that  whenever  the  uncertainty
effect  is important,  the  direct  anticipation  effect  is  not  and  vice  versa.
This  result  is reversed  in the  non-expected  utility  approach,  as  we found  out:
the  two  effects  are  complemer;cary  in thb  case  where  the  direct  anticipation
effect  is important.
These  results  have important  policy  implications.  If the  trade  reform
will  not  be reversed,  but  the  Government  cannot  credibly  communicate  that  to
the  private  sector,  consumers  effectively  trade  off  t'e  wrong  intertemporal
prices.  As a consequence,  private  savings  will  be suboptimally  low;  this
justifies  policy  intervention  to increase  private  savings,  preferably  through
a temprorary  increase  in  consumption  taxes.  If that  is  not  feasible,  a case
can  be  made for  temporary  tariffs  as  a second  best  response;  this  would  be
equivalent  to gradual  rather  than  'cold  turkey"  liberalization.  This is  a
specia'l  case  of a  moie  beneral  point  made  by Calvo  (1988a,b):  mistaken  beliefs
about  future  policy  "ct  like  a  distortion  and  therefore  justify  policy
intervention  in  principle.
A magnifying  impact  could  come  about  if the  private  savings  response
leads  to  such  a large  current  account  deficit  that  the  trade  reform  itself
does in  fact  get  reversel,  a case  of self-fulfilling  prophecy.  5/  This  very
real  possibility  further  strengthens  the  case  for  policy  intervention  to
increase  private  savings,  and,  arguably,  for  external  support  in the  early
periods  of trade  reform,  possibly  through  institutions  like  the  World  Bank  or
IMF.
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